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Canadian Industrial Relations — 
The Task Force Report 
Adolf Sturmthal 
After an overall judgment of the Report, the author 
examines problems such as the emergency strike, the 
aliénation of the worker, the long-term full employment, 
inflation, industrial democracy, union certification, union 
security and wage parity. 
Following shortly upon the publication of the British Donovan 
Report, the release of the report of the Canadian Commission invites 
comparison (why the peaceful Çanadians hâve chosen to call their 
committee a « Task Force » raises questions beyond the competency, but 
not the curiosity, of this observer). Obviously thèse two nations felt 
the need to take stock of what has corne to be know as their «industrial 
relations System. » The debates and législation in France regarding the 
rôle of the union in the plant and the vague slogan of « participation > 
in management, the attempts in West Germany to extend « co-determin-
ation > beyond its présent narrow confines, and the abandonment by the 
new administration in the United States of the guideposts for wages and 
priées — ail indicate that some self-conscious soûl searching is going 
on in the industrial relations field in many of the Western countries. 
While the reasons for this are 
many and varied, some thèmes occur 
again and again and indicate at least 
a few of the underlying causes for 
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dissatisfaction and self-examination. One of those is the rising tide of 
public impatience with strikes in gênerai and those in « essential enter-
prises » in particular. Another thème is the so-called « aliénation » of the 
worker. A third problem area inviting examination and reform proposais 
is that of the famous magie triangle of full employment, price stability, 
free collective bargaining. In at least one case this has been enlarged 
into a quadrangle by the addition of a fourth élément, that of exchange 
rate stability. Adjustment to rapid technological change in another 
récurrent thème. Most of thèse problems — the exchange rate issue is 
an interesting exception unless my search was too hasty — are dealt 
with in the report of the Canadian Commission. 
There are obvious limits to what an outside observer, even one 
who has some acquaintance with Canadian problems including those of 
French-speaking Canada, and usefully say about the Report. Lack of 
knowledge of détail — which often looms so large in the industrial rela-
tions area — and considérations of tact combine to impose restraint. 
Moreover, this observer is compelled to state from the beginning that 
he is biased in favor of the Report. On a number of crucial questions 
the Report cornes out in favor of almost precisely the formula which 
the reviewer would hâve chosen, had he been a member of the Task 
Force. It will then not corne as a surprise to the reader that I regard 
this study as being located mostly on the side of the angels and, at least 
for this stage of our social évolution, as a forward-looking document. 
Most important of ail : it allows for future changes and admits to 
ignorance where in its view, social scientists hâve failed so f ar to produce 
convincing évidence for one or another of the conflicting thèses put 
forward in public discussions. 
I shall take up some main thèmes and a few of the more tangential 
topics seriatim, referring to both the expository sections of the Report 
and the concluding « Recommendations and Observations » as they relate 
to a given topic. But before embarking upon this discussion, I should 
perhaps stress and endorse the overall judgment of the Report; which 
accepts the principles of the présent system while proposing modifications 
— none of which affects thèse « principles. » 
Public Interest Conflict 
The basic premise is the acceptance of « antagonistic coopération > 
as the ideology of framework of industrial relations in a free society. 
This implies that the advantages of (relatively) freely arrived contracts 
are regarded as outweighing the undeniable but unavoidable disadvantages 
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inhérent in the System such as strikes and lockouts.(1) Methods to reduce 
the volume and intensity of conflicts are recommended. The most 
intriguing propositions of the Report refer to those conflicts where the 
public interest is most directly involved, « emergency » strikes, i.e., strikes 
creating emergencies. The Report correctly observes that it is the duration 
of the stoppage which is of crucial importance in creating an emergency 
and that it is fundamentally a political décision whether and how a given 
stoppage ought to be terminated or not. The Report, motivated partly 
by a désire to keep thèse issues from sliding more and more into the 
political arena, suggests setting up a spécial Public Interest Disputes 
Commission. It is supposed to do two kinds of things : propose procédures 
for industries where strikes are most likely to « jeopardize the public 
interest, » and, second, handle actual disputes of this kind as far as they 
corne under fédéral jurisdiction. The Commission might prescribe procéd-
ures for seulement, but not compulsory arbitration (or any of a séries 
of other possible measures of compulsion). At the request of the 
government, however, the Commission might propose such measures 
which then the government might either enact or submit to Parliament 
for enactment. The Report clearly favors the latter procédure. In the 
light of U.S. expérience with the Taft-Hartley precedures for dealing 
with emergency work stoppages, the unlimited variety of possible measures 
recommended in the Canadian report seems préférable. 
There is far greater wisdom also in the Canadian way of dealing 
with public employées. That fire fighters and public law enforcement 
officers are deprived of the right to strike (and protected against the 
threat of a lock-out) seems reasonable enough, especially since they are 
given the right to organize and to bargain collectively and since binding 
arbitration rather than unilatéral décision by the — public — employer 
is to be provided. Equally important is that this — and other — restrictions 
are based not upon some misunderstood notion of sovereignty — as is so 
often argued in the U.S. — but simply and reasonably upon « the high 
public interest in the continuing availability of the services of thèse officers 
as well as firefighters. » Why it should be impossible to approach this 
problem in the same down-to-earth fashion in the U.S. défies rational 
explanation. The same impartial and incisive reasoning is applied to the 
licensed professions. The Report deserves to be quoted on this issue : 
O) The fact that I am treating the strike issue as the first thème should not be 
interpreted to mean that I regard it as the most important or urgent problem. 
In my view, it is not ; but the public seems to regard it as such — off and no — 
and that fact makes it a first-rate political issue. 
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" Where self-employed professionals those to act collectively to 
establish fee schedules or otherwise to protect their économie interests, 
a case can be made that they . . . be required to act through an 
organization other than their licensing body in order to avoid a 
temptation to employ licensing as a restrictive device to reduce entry 
and control market supply. " 
After this forceful and — I believe — wise statement, it is somewhat of a 
let-down to find the Report recommend morely further study. This 
disappointment is somewhat offset by the Report's recommendation of 
collective bargaining rights for ail kinds of legally independent and 
economically dépendent groups such as fishermen, owner-drivers of taxis 
and trucks, and, though the Task Force was not empowered to do so, for 
agricultural and domestic workers who corne under provincial législation. 
Few groups need collective bargaining rights more than thèse last two. 
Aliénation of the Worker 
A good deal more ought to be said about the Report's recommenda-
tions on the shorteomings of collective bargaining, especially on the 
limits in the scope of the issues subject to it. But we must move on to 
the next group of problems which hâve corne to be known under the 
nowadays fashionable level of « aliénation. » Even the Report — other-
wise a sober document — has fallen victim to the revival of early Marxian 
terminology. It is probably correct that neither unions nor management 
fully understand the nature of the problem. Increased pay is no remedy 
and managements failure to sélect technologies that make « work more 
edifying » as the Report puts it, looms large in the picture. 
Some of the most incisive but unfortunately inconclusive observations 
of the Report deal with union membership restiveness. This phenomenon 
extends of course far beyond the confines of Canada or the U.S. German 
unions, in a country with a long history of class consciousness, report 
that steady and large-scale recruitment of new members is required to 
maintain stable membership figures because of a large turnover. The 
Report lists a few of the most obvious explanations of this growing 
disenchantment of union members — particularly the younger ones — 
including the increasing difficulty of producing an internai consensus 
within the unions. I cannot help feeling, however, that there is far more 
to this phenomenon than the Report suggests. The « génération gap » 
matters in industrial relations almost as much as in the académie world. 
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Sortie Economie Issues 
A sizeable portion of the Report is devoted to an examination of 
the problems attendant upon long-term full employment. Any discussion 
of this should start from the proposition that thèse are the problems of 
affluence and achievement, incomparably easier to bear than the horrible 
troubles of the lean thirties. Intellectually, on the other hand, we seem 
to be not much less helpless in the face of our current dilemmas than the 
Western world was when confronted, three décades ago, by long-term 
mass unemployment. The Report well reflects the current state of our 
knowledge. The « Yes — but » and « No — but, » on the one hand, and 
on the other hand, are dotted ail over the landscape in those parts of 
the Report that deal with the analytical aspects of the problem. Still, there 
are some suggestions that progress is slowly being made in our under-
standing of the issues. As one example, the Report speaks of a trade-off 
« zone > between unemployment and inflation with the degree of inflation 
in the external environment being introduced as an additional variable. <2> 
It would appear that given the probable impact of the environment 3 per 
cent unemployment is incompatible with anything less than a 2 per cent 
annual increase in the consumer price index. Even with policies designed 
to eliminate sectoral bottlenecks an unemployment rate of 3.5 per cent 
would be required — under reasonably optimistic assumptions about 
external influences — to keep consumer price inflation at somewhere 
between 1.5 and 2 per cent. 
From a spécial study of the Economie Council <3> it would follow 
that in the lower unemployment range — say around 3 per cent — Canada 
has a relatively high inflationary potential compared with other Western 
countries ; beyond 4 per cent it shares with the U.S. pride of place as a 
relatively non-inflationary country. <4> The U.K., at the same unemploy-
ment level, shows an annual rate of price increase of more than one per 
cent. Insufficient data exist to judge what Canada's standing would be 
below the 3 per cent level. Unfortunately thèse comparisons are based 
upon such short periods that few, if any, generalizations can be derived 
(2) In actual fact, the concept of the trade-off zone was first used by the Economie 
Council of Canada in its Third Annual Report. 
(3) Ronald G. Bodkin and others, Price Stability and High Employment : The 
Options for Canadian Economie Policy " ; Spécial Study No. 5, Economie Council 
of Canada Queen's Printer, Ottawa, 1966. 
(4) Thèse relationships are based upon rigorous assumptions regarding the interna-
tional rate of inflation. In fact, the U.S. expérience of the last two years — thougb 
it does not meet the assumptions — does not seem to verify the conclusions of the 
study, although in ail fairness it cannot be said that the expérience clearly contra-
dicts them. 
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from them — except the dubious comfort of the récognition that « no 
libéral démocratie industrial state has mastered the trade-off challenge. > 
The Report distinguishes three kinds of inflation : demand-pull, 
cost-push, and a third type related to demand-shifts. It would lead too 
far in this review of the Report to examine this classification in too much 
détail or to discuss the — to my mind, vastly exaggerated — hopes of 
the authors of the Report that « adéquate cost-benefit analyses of un-
employment and inflation » could assist in providing a safer basis for 
policy-making than judgment can provide. Unfortunately, some of the 
most important social conséquences of unemployment and inflation are 
beyond the methods of measurement presently available. Moreover, the 
detailed configurations of unemployment and inflation — whose variety 
is infinité — are of material importance in determining both costs and 
benefits of any policy. Thus in a non-homogeneous society such as the 
U.S. it is important to consider not only the average unemployment rate 
but also its distribution over various population groups. Thus we know 
that Negroes appear twice as frequently in the unemployment statistics 
than the national average, that youngsters, particularly girls, hâve un-
employment rates that are a multiple of those of the adults so that black 
youngsters bear a very disproportionate share of the burden of unemploy-
ment. No one can understand the contemporary social problems of the 
U.S. without référence to thèse facts. Admittedly, they would be of little 
relevance to Canada, but may nevertheless deserve at least a brief mention. 
In the end, the Report concludes with a warning against « the dangers 
of assigning the responsibility for inflation to particular causes > and 
favors full employment over price stability (p. 188), a formula whose 
vagueness expresses a noble sentiment rather than guidance for policy-
making. Unfortunately the question still remains : how much inflation 
versus how much less unemployment? I do, however, fully agrée with 
the Report that « the real challenge is to improve the trade-off between 
the two. » The list of suggestions to this effect in the Report is impressive. 
Other Problems 
A number of other issues dealt with in the Report deserve at least 
a brief référence. The problem of industrial democracy is handled in 
about the same fashion it would be in the U.S., namely by treating the 
union as a countervailing force. Still I find it interesting that other forms 
of industrial democracy are at least mentioned « ranging from mutual 
co-operation to co-determination in areas not normally subject to collective 
bargaining. > This statement, though vague, goes further than any similarly 
officiai U.S. document is likely to do at présent. 
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The proposais for union certification and even more those for 
decertification sound reasonable and interesting (particularly those for 
decertification). On the subject of union security, the Report favors the 
« agency fee, > Le., a system in which employées in a bargaining unit 
represented by a union must pay the « regular and reasonable dues of the 
union, » whether they are members or not. This system to cempensate the 
union for services which it must render under the law in behalf of ail 
employées in the bargaining unit — whether union members or not — is 
at présent widely discussed in Europe. German and Swiss unions hâve 
been complaining that union membership is slipping while the labor force 
is expanding, so that the number of « free riders > is growing rapidly. 
The sensé of class solidarity which formerly motivated union affiliation 
to a very large extent has been declining at a fast pace while the remnants 
of feudal class consciousness disappear in the floods of prosperity, or 
were destroyed by the Nazi régime and the war. The agency shop seems a 
reasonable response to this situation. More realistic than the American 
legislator, the authors do not advocate outlawing further-going union 
security arrangements such as the closed shop, but prefer instead to 
provide guarantees for the union member's civil rights. Their protection 
is to be entrusted to a Public Review Board and législation is to be 
enacted to ensure basic union democracy. 
The Canadian problem in this area is complicated by the close 
relationship of many Canadian unions to a particular political party. 
While some unions seem to operate in this area in about the same way as 
U.S. unions do, others are closer to the British model. They see themselves 
as « instruments of social transformation » and in this effort cooperate 
with a particular party which they support. It is significant, in this context, 
that the Report recommends the adoption of the British model with 
regard to the handling of membership dues in an effort to protect union 
members with divergent political views. Indeed, the Report goes further 
even than the British in protecting the dissenting minority since the request 
of the union member for « opting out « can be made to the Canada 
Labour Relations Board rather than the union itself, in order to safeguard 
the anonymity of the union member. Quite clearly, thèse clauses would 
apply equally and especially in the case of agency shops where the issue 
of political loyalty may play an important rôle. 
One word on the issue of « wage parity. » As long as this policy is 
formulated in terms which make Canadian dollars appear équivalent to 
U.S. dollars, one could regard the problem at first sight as one of 
semantics — words being taken as équivalent for facts. This, however, 
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is only a part of the story. Driven to its extrême, Le., made universal, 
wage parity defined as above, would transfer to the balance of payments 
and through it to the exchange rate between Canadian and U.S. dollar 
the burden of adjustment for différences in labor productivity and thus 
change import priées for Canadians in such a way as to reflect the relative 
productivities. This is a possible System but it would deal with fiction 
(a dollar is a dollar whether Canadian or U.S.) rather than fact (real 
incomes). It is of course a vastly différent proposition when applied to 
only one industry rather than the entire economy. 
Some of the most intriguing questions that the Report raises in my 
mind relate to the impact of outside models upon a two-tradition country 
like Canada. There seems to be little doubt that the basic légal pattern 
dérives from Britain. I am wondering whether the idea of the « extension » 
of collective agreements (making them applicable to fions of a particular 
industry not represented at the bargaining table) adopted by Québec in 
1934 <5> originated with the same source which inspired the introduction 
of the same principle in France, two years later. However, since the 
British had adopted a similar principle in the Cotton Manufacturing 
Industry (Temporary Provisions) Act of 1934 — as an exceptional 
measure for one industry faced with the possible collapse of the whole 
principle of collective bargaining — the ancestry of the « extension » 
method as it applied to Québec, is probably difficult to establish. The 
more récent impact of American labor législation, beginning with the 
Wagner Act, is fairly easy to ascertain in a large number of principles 
of Canadian industrial relations. The Report itself, however, has gone its 
own way. It may very well hâve set up in several points a model for its 
neighbor to the South to watch and, quite possibly, to follow. 
RAPPORT DE L'ÉQUIPE SPÉCIALISÉE 
EN RELATIONS DU TRAVAIL 
Le Canada, tout comme l'Angleterre avec son rapport Donovan, a senti le 
besoin de procéder à un sérieux examen de son système de relations industrielles. 
<5> " . . . introduced a new élément into the formai machinery of labor relations. " 
H. D. Woods and Sylvia Ostry, Labour Policy and Labour Economies in Canada, 
Macmillan of Canada, Toronto, 1962, p. 23. 
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Sans vouloir reprendre chacun des thèmes développés par le «Task Force», nous 
nous arrêterons à ceux qui nous paraissent les plus importants à savoir les grèves 
en général — et également dans le secteur des services essentiels —, l'aliénation 
des travailleurs et quelques problèmes d'ordre économique. 
Nous devons cependant dès le départ prévenir le lecteur que nous sommes 
biaisé en faveur du rapport et ce parce que ses conclusions sont presqu'identiques 
à celles auxquelles nous serions arrivé si nous avions été membre de cette Com-
mission. 
La recommandation la plus intéressante de ce rapport est à notre avis, celle 
qui réfère à la création d'une commission dite des conflits d'intérêt public pour 
pallier ou du moins diminuer la portée des grèves dites d'urgence. Cette recom-
mandation est basée sur le désir de l'Équipe spécialisée d'éviter que ces conflits 
aboutissent de plus en plus sur la scène politique. 
Un second groupe de problèmes a retenu l'attention des auteurs du rapport : 
on peut les coiffer du titre générique d'aliénation du travailleur. Sur ce point, 
notons simplement que l'Équipe spécialisée a été victime dans une certaine mesure, 
de la terminologie marxiste. 
Une partie importante du rapport a été consacrée à l'étude des problèmes 
soulevés par le plein-emploi de longue période. Sur ce point, le travail des spécia-
listes est un bon résumé des connaissances actuelles sur le sujet. Notons cependant 
que quelques-unes des recommandations démontrent un certain progrès dans la 
compréhension de ce problème très complexe. 
Les auteurs distinguent trois sortes d'inflation : celle due au « demand-pull », 
une autre consécutive au « cost-push » et un troisième type relevant des « demand-
shifts ». Il serait beaucoup trop long d'examiner ici cette classification en détail. 
Notons simplement qu'ils aboutissent à une mise en garde contre les dangers de 
vouloir identifier des causes particulières à l'inflation. En plus, ils favorisent le 
plein emploi au détriment de la stabilité des prix, formule très vague qui est plus 
un voeu pieux qu'un guide pour l'établissement d'une politique. 
Le rapport fait également mention d'un certain nombre d'autres problèmes : 
la démocratie industrielle, l'accréditation, la « désaccréditation » et la sécurité syn-
dicale, chapitre où les auteurs proposent l'établissement de 1' « agency fee» en 
réponse à la baisse constante du sens de solidarité de classe. Nous sommes ici 
d'accord avec les auteurs et nous croyons qu'ils manifestent sur ce point un plus 
grand réalisme que le législateur américain. Le rapport attaque également la 
question délicate de la parité de salaire et le sérieux problème de l'impact des 
autres systèmes de relations industrielles sur un pays à double tradition tel le 
Canada. 
Sur plusieurs points, l'étude de l'Équipe spécialisée en relations du travail 
peut avoir établi un modèle que les Américains devraient examiner et peut-être 
même, suivre. 
